


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Chronology of Events

The so-called Shanghai incident broke out shortly before midnight on January 28, 1932, when Chinese armed plainclothes men (*pienyitui*) and regular troops attacked the Japanese bluejackets who were proceeding from their headquarters on North Szechuen Road to their posts for garrison duty within the zone assigned to the Japanese at a conference of all the foreign defence commanders the day before. Earlier that day the Shanghai Municipal Council had issued a proclamation declaring a State of Emergency throughout the International Settlement, effective at 4 p.m. the same day, and ordered the Shanghai Volunteers and special constables out to duty. British and American defence forces also took up positions at their respective sectors soon after the proclamation.

But forces had been at work for months prior to the outbreak of this incident, contributing in one way or other to the development of this clash. These must be outlined briefly.

1. Anti-Japanese Agitations and Boycott

The anti-Japanese agitations and the boycott of Japanese goods were commenced in Shanghai and other large Chinese cities and towns beginning about the end of July, 1931, when what is known as the Korean incident (retaliation by Koreans in Heijo, Keijo, etc. for persecutions of Korean peasants in Manchuria by Chinese landlords and officials, culminating in the well-known Wanpaoshan affair) took place. These anti-Japanese movements, however, assumed a more organized and violent form in September, immediately following the clash in Mukden between Chinese and Japanese troops. Japanese residents and business men in Shanghai, or those having business relations with Shanghai, suffered the most from these anti-Japanese movements, for Shanghai has always been the hotbed of anti-Japanese ideas and the center for anti-Japanese campaigns.

Hostile feelings against the Japanese had been persistently inculcated among the Chinese people by the Nanking Government's Ministry of Education through school text-books and courses of studies designed purposely for that object, the local authorities, student organizations, and leaders of the Kuomintang, the only political party in China. What was termed the "Association to Resist Japan and to Save the Nation" was formed in practically every important city of China. The Shanghai "Amalgamated Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association" was the most powerful, best organized, and most violently antagonistic against the Japanese. This body directed all the anti-Japanese agitations

(mass meetings, processions, propaganda, etc.) and the boycott, which was accompanied by various forms of violence.

Not a single day passed in Shanghai without witnessing some cases of insult and attack upon harmless Japanese school children, other Japanese residents, and the Japanese naval patrols. The attitude of the Chinese in and out of the Settlements was exceedingly hostile, provocative, and challenging toward the Japanese. They were ready to pick quarrels with the Japanese, and the police were unable to control the mobs.

Posters inscribed with slogans appeared everywhere on the streets in Shanghai, inside the Settlements as well as in the Chinese city, such as "Boycott all Japanese goods!", "Arm yourselves and fight the Japanese!", "Down with Japanese Imperialism!", "Kill the Japanese!" Even the Chinese Government post-office and its branch offices inside the Settlement were full of these posters, plastered on the windows, doorways, walls, etc.

Chinese merchants were strictly forbidden to buy or sell Japanese merchandise. Japanese goods were forcibly seized by pickets not only from Chinese shops and merchants, but often also from Japanese hands at the waterfront or *en route* from steamers to the shops. Chinese merchants found dealing in such goods were caught, detained, fined, threatened with capital punishment, or lynched by boycott leaders and pickets, all illegally of course. Needless to say, the losses and damage suffered by the Japanese shipping firms, export and import merchants, general business men, cotton mills, and the Japanese community at large were enormous. Finally, the Chinese, too, began to suffer from the boycott, but they were unable to resist the all-powerful Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association, otherwise they would be branded as "traitors" by the officials of this organization.

Repeated warnings and protests by Japanese authorities against these illegal acts, assaults upon Japanese nationals, malicious propaganda, fell upon deaf ears. During October and November these agitations and the boycott activities were most serious in Shanghai.

All the Japanese in Shanghai, and to some extent those in other China cities, had to endure patiently, for there was nothing that they or their official representatives could do. The Chinese authorities, both central and local, had practically no control or influence to stop these illegal bodies and their outrages.

2. Insult to the Japanese Emperor

The *Minkuo Jihpao*, the official organ of the Kuomintang, on January 9, 1932, published an article with a highly insulting and indiscreet reference to the escape which H.I.M. the Emperor of Japan had the previous day in Tokyo from an attempt made upon

his person by a youthful Korean. The sister papers in Tsingtao and Foochow likewise published similar indiscreet headlines and articles in much stronger phraseology. The Japanese Consuls-General in Shanghai, Tsingtao, and Foochow, respectively, filed protests with the local Chinese authorities against these articles, declaring them a serious insult to the Japanese Imperial House and the Japanese nation, and demanding formal apologies both by the officials and by the editors of these papers. The officials dilly-dallied, while the editors of these papers refused to comply, giving all sorts of excuses and even ridiculing the Japanese Consular officials for their alleged "lack of the knowledge of Chinese." But finally, on Jan. 21, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, Wu Teh-cheng, offered an apology to Consul-General K. Murai, and the *Minkuo Jihpao* published in an inconspicuous corner of the paper an excuse and apology, as well as a correction of the article. Those in Tsingtao and Foochow followed the example of the paper in Shanghai.

3. Attack Upon Japanese Priests and Religious Devotees

Japanese feeling was further aroused by the unwarranted and unprovoked attack made by some 60 Chinese gangsters in Yangtzepoo, just outside the Settlement limits, upon five Japanese Buddhists, including two priests. This attack took place at about 4 p.m. January 18, when the *Minkuo Jihpao* incident was yet to be settled. Two of the Japanese were slightly wounded, but the remaining three were so brutally handled and struck with stones, clubs, and bricks that they fell almost completely unconscious. One of them the Rev. Hideo Minakami, died six days later from the wounds inflicted.

The indignation of the Japanese residents in Shanghai was now brought to a high pitch. This feeling was such that in the small hours of January 20 a party of hot-blooded Japanese civilians proceeded to the Sanyue towel factory in Yangtszepoo, whose workers were responsible for the assault upon the priests and their followers, in order to avenge their fellow-countrymen. These men set fire to a part of the factory, and on their way back clashed with the Chinese constables of the S.M.C., resulting in a few casualties on both sides. The Japanese involved in this incident subsequently surrendered themselves to the Japanese Consular police, who accordingly deported them to Nagasaki for trial in accordance with the provisions of law. The *Minkuo Jihpao*, which had been continuing its virulent anti-Japanese propaganda, published an abusive article accusing the Japanese bluejackets of according protection to the Japanese civilians, a complete fabrication. The Japanese naval authorities demanded a publication of correction and apology for this false accusation, which the journal refused.

On January 20 a mass meeting of some 1,000 Japanese residents of Shanghai took place in the Japanese Club auditorium. This meeting, after condemning the Chinese for the repeated acts of violence and agitation against the Japanese, that reached its climax in the assault upon the Buddhist priests, passed a resolution asking the home Government to despatch additional warships and military units to Shanghai in order to secure adequate protection of Japanese lives and property.

In view of the high tension thus prevailing between the Japanese and the Chinese, the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai, considering it of urgent necessity to remove the immediate cause of the tension, presented the following demands to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai on January 21 :

1. Formal apology by the Mayor.
2. Arrest and punishment of the assailants.
3. Payment of hospital bills and solatium.
4. Control of all illegal acts against the Japanese and the suppression of all anti-Japanese propaganda, in particular the immediate dissolution of the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association and similar bodies.

4. Mayor Wu's Hesitancy to Meet Japanese Demands

Mayor Wu Teh-cheng of Greater Shanghai expressed his reluctance to accept the Japanese Consul-General's demands on the ground that it was impossible for him to dissolve the anti-Japanese organization or suppress all anti-Japanese movements, for they were motivated by "patriotic feelings." He failed to reply for fully seven days, despite repeated requests from the Japanese official. Rear-Admiral Koichi Shiozawa, Commander of the Japanese Yangtze patrol squadron, on the night of January 21 issued a statement (not an ultimatum, as newspapers termed it) announcing that, in case the Chinese authorities failed to display sincerity and comply with the Japanese wishes, he might be obliged to take such measures as he deemed necessary for the protection of Japanese nationals and their property.

5. Hostile Preparations by Chinese Troops

All this while the Chinese troops around the Settlement (the 19th Route Army) were busily engaged in hostile preparations against the Japanese, digging strong trenches, erecting barricades, and putting up barbed-wire entanglements along the boundaries of the International Settlement, especially near the headquarters of the Japanese naval landing party. These defence workers were daily increased and strengthened, while more and more troops were massed near the Settlement borders.

On January 24 members of an anti-Japanese organization set fire to the official residence of the Japanese Minister to China. On January 28 a bomb was hurled at the Japanese Consulate-General building by members of the same organization.

The Chinese press and other organizations continued to indulge in anti-Japanese agitations and propaganda. Mayor Wu was threatened by Chinese students that, if he accepted the Japanese demands, wholesale rioting would break out among the soldiers and student mobs.

6. Chinese Police Flight from Chapei

Some 200 Chinese police officers in Chapei, the district immediately next to the International Settlement, where some 3,000 Japanese were residing, fled and disappeared by about noon on January 28, leaving the district entirely unpoliced. This exposed the Japanese residents in that district to great danger, and caused considerable anxiety, especially so because of the active war preparations which had been going on in that area by the Chinese soldiers, and in view also of the ever aggravating situation and growing tension. Both foreigners and Chinese residents in that area began to flee into the Settlement.

Events Immediately Preceding the Clash and Afterward

Jan. 28—At 3 p.m. Mayor Wu Teh-cheng notified Consul-General Murai of the acceptance of the Japanese demands. The Japanese Consul-General informed the Mayor that he was satisfied with the Chinese reply and that he would watch how the promises would be put into practice. Mr. Murai also requested the Mayor to cause the Chinese troops in Chapei to discontinue all hostile preparations, and the Mayor agreed to do so. But the Mayor, having no control over the 19th Route Army, could not compel the troops to comply with the Japanese request.

4 p.m.—State of Emergency was declared by the authorities of the International Settlement.

8.30 p.m.—Japanese naval authorities issued a notice stating that, in accordance with the proclamation of the State of Emergency by the S.M.C., the Japanese Navy would assume charge of peace and order in the sector assigned to it by the Shanghai Defence Committee.

- 10 p.m.—Reports were in circulation that Chinese plainclothes men and communists had started attacks upon Japanese at several points in and out of the Settlement.
- 11.30 p.m.—Japanese naval landing party prepare to report to their assigned posts. Immediately upon leaving headquarters, Chinese plainclothes snipers fired upon the Japanese from a point near the public swimming pool at Hongkew Park, in front of the naval landing party's headquarters, wounding several bluejackets. A few minutes later other Japanese naval units were also attacked by Chinese snipers and regular troops while on their way to their posts.
- 12 midnight.—Hostilities commenced at various places in Chapei, which continued until dawn. These surprise attacks by the Chinese caused 11 deaths, 64 seriously wounded, and 24 slightly wounded among the Japanese by the following morning.
- Jan. 29—Consul-General Murai again requested Mayor Wu to cause the Chinese troops to withdraw a certain distance in order to avoid further clashes. This request, however, was unheeded and the Chinese kept on firing, in consequence of which the Japanese were compelled to resort to more drastic measures, including the use of aeroplanes. Beginning the night before, Chinese plainclothes men continually fired upon Japanese dwellings, buildings, and naval guards. These activities have continued ever since, daily and nightly.
- 8 p.m.—Truce effected between Chinese and Japanese, through the good offices of the American and British Consuls General. Japanese cotton mills in Shanghai closed.
- Jan. 30—6.30 a.m.—Chinese troops in Chapei open fire into Japanese garrison zone and Settlement, in spite of their promise to observe the truce. Japanese obliged to return fire. One cruiser and 12 destroyers, with additional landing party, arrive in Shanghai.
- Jan. 31—Efforts made by the Japanese naval and consular authorites, through the good offices of the American and British Consuls-General, to put the truce into effect, but of no avail, as the Chinese were continually violating the truce and firing into the Settlement and the Japanese garrison area.
- Feb. 1, 2, 3—Intermittent firing between Chinese and Japanese forces in Chapei. Chinese forts at Woosung fired upon Japanese destroyers on February. 3.

- Feb. 4—Shanghai-Nagasaki cable line, operated by the Japanese, cut by Chinese soldiers at Woosung. Vice-Admiral K. Nomura appointed Commander of third Japanese Fleet (including First China or Yangtse Squadron).
- Feb. 5, 6—Firing continued in Chapei, the Japanese using planes.
- Feb. 7—Japanese Government's Statement issued in Tokyo, as well as in Shanghai, relative to Shanghai affair, and announcing despatch of land forces. Advance guards of military forces land in Woosung on night of Feb. 7.
- Feb. 8, 9, 10—Little activity both at Woosung and Chapei.
- Feb. 11—By mistake, caused by defective mechanism, a Japanese plane dropped a bomb on Wing On Mill at Markham Road, within the Settlement, falling within the sector assigned to U.S. Marines. Japanese Naval Commander, Vice-Admiral Nomura, at once tendered apology to U.S. Naval and Marine Corps Commanders.
- Feb. 12—During four hours' truce, Major F. Haylely-Bell, S.V.C., and Father Jacquinot, with a rescue party, went into Chapei and rescued 250 civilians, mostly Chinese. Even during this period (8 a.m. to 12 noon) the Chinese fired into the Japanese positions.
- Feb. 13—Lt.-General Kenichi Uyeda, commander of the Japanese military forces, and his staff, as well as the troops, arrived in Shanghai at about 6.30 p.m. A brief statement was issued by Lt.-General Uyeda to the press.
- Feb. 14, 15, 16, 17—Chinese shells fell repeatedly inside Settlement area and Extension roads, wounding many Japanese residents. On Feb. 17 two British sailors were mortally wounded at Hongkew wharf by such Chinese shells.
- Feb. 18—9 p.m.—Lt.-General Uyeda issued a note of warning demanding withdrawal of Chinese troops 20 kilometres away from Settlement borders, north of Soochow Creek, the front lines, by 7 a.m. Feb. 20, and the entire evacuation by 5 p.m. Feb. 20. Consul-General Murai also sent a note to Mayor Wu along same lines.
- Feb. 20—7.30 a.m.—The Chinese having failed to withdraw, Japanese land forces, acting in co-operation with the naval landing party, commenced offensive against Chinese.
- Feb. 22—Japanese civilian casualties caused by Chinese plain-clothes men's activities total to date 8 killed, 12 seriously wounded and 21 slightly wounded.

How Wars are Fomented

(By George Bronson Rea in *The Far Eastern Review*, Feb., 1932)

On January 18, 1915, Japan presented Twenty One Demands to the President of China. Group Two concerned the extension of the Liaotung Lease and the term of the South Manchuria and the Antung-Mukden Railways to a further period of ninety-nine years. It also provided for the right of Japanese subjects to own and lease land, erect buildings thereon, liberty of residence and travel and right to engage in business, industry and commerce in South Manchuria and Inner Eastern Mongolia. In addition, it called for the recognition of certain mining rights and various railway privileges.

This, in reality, was all that Japan hoped to get out of the whole series of demands, but true to Asiatic traditions, asked for ten times more than she expected. There was no sustained opposition on the part of the Chinese Government to conceding the demands covered by Group II and these were substantially complied with after a few conferences. China also gave way on the demands over Shantung but rejected the rest.

Before accepting the demands agreed upon, the Chinese approached the Japanese and confided that an ultimatum would expedite the conclusion of the treaty and give the Chinese Government a plausible excuse for signing it. As usual, the Chinese outfoxed the Japanese and placed them in a vulnerable position. On the accuracy of this statement now hinges the Chinese case that the Treaty of May 15 covering the demands of Group II was extracted under duress. Viscount Kato, the Japanese Foreign Minister at the time the treaty was negotiated, is authority for the statement that the ultimatum was privately requested by the Chinese to "save their face." Marquis Okuma, Japan's Prime Minister at the time, made a similar statement before his death. Other Japanese diplomatic officials then on duty at the Legation in Peking, support this testimony. Dr. Sun Yat-sen also confirmed the Japanese version of the ultimatum in private talks with American newspaper correspondents.

The Chinese Government, however, sticks to the official record and insists that the ultimatum destroys the legality of the treaty and therefore it will never recognize it. Hardly had the ink dried on the treaty, when the Chinese Government on June 25, 1915, issued a Presidential Decree making it a treasonable offense for any Chinese to injure the rights of the country by entering into a contract with foreigners. In subsequent years, when the program to oust Japan from Manchuria became an obsession, many special laws and regulations were drawn up and enforced by the various

Manchurian authorities, prohibiting the sale or lease of lands or houses to Japanese subjects, thus precipitating the many incidents in which Koreans were deprived of their leases after having re-claimed the land and improved the properties. The enforcement of these laws led to the Wanpaoshan affair, the frenzied retaliation of the Koreans and the rapid intensification of the whole dispute to the inevitable crisis.

Relying on the promise of the American Minister in Peking that the United States would support her claims at the Paris Peace Conference, China placed her fight in the hands of the American Delegation. Had it not been that Great Britain, France and Italy had secretly agreed to support Japan's acquisitions as part compensation for her participation in the war, China undoubtedly would have won her case at Paris. Disappointed and bitterly resentful over her defeat, China refused to sign the Versailles Treaty and dispatched a rabid anti-Japanese agitator to Washington to break the treaty in the Senate and stir up American resentment against Japan. The Senate's rejection of the Treaty and refusal to join the League, while based on purely domestic polities, was undeniably influenced and strengthened by the propaganda over Shantung. China cannot escape her share of the responsibility for crippling the League at its birth. China then signed the Treaty of Trianon and automatically became a member of the League.

At the Washington Conference, China again made a determined effort to bring Japan to the bar of justice over the 1915 Treaty but was defeated by the fact that Japan accepted the invitation to attend the conference on the express condition that her rights in Manchuria should not be included in the agenda. China made a dignified yet desperate assault upon the 1915 Treaty compelling the Japanese delegate, Baron Shidehara, to place on record Japan's position in the following words :

... "if it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent would be established with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere."

China's Delegate, Dr. Wang, answering Baron Shidehara, placed on record the following ominous statement ;

"The Chinese Delegation has the honor to say that a still more dangerous precedent will be established with consequences upon the stability of international relations which cannot be estimated, if, without rebuke or protest from other Powers, one nation can obtain from a friendly, but, in a military sense, weaker neighbor, and under circumstances such as

attended the negotiations and signing of the treaties of 1915, valuable concessions which were not in satisfaction of pending controversies and for which no *quid pro quo* was offered."

When her efforts to have the Manchurian issue settled by the Conference failed, China reserved the right to seek a solution on all future appropriate occasions. When the original 25 year lease to Port Arthur and Dalny expired in 1923, adhering to her declared intention to ignore the 1915 Treaty as illegal, China formally notified Japan of the termination of the lease and requested the restoration of her sovereignty over the territory. Japan refused to discuss the matter.

From 1923, no further steps were taken to enforce the Chinese viewpoint until Marshal Chang Tso-lin was killed. His son and successor, allying himself with the Kuomintang and the rights recovery movement of the Nationalist Government carried out through the evasion, repudiation and abrogation of treaties and agreements, started a campaign that had for its object the slow strangulation of Japan's industries and enterprises in Manchuria by unfair competition, economic pressure, ignoring of agreements, crushing taxation and other methods designed to bring financial ruin to the South Manchuria Railway and its subsidiary enterprises. Declaring war upon Japan within the peace pacts, China was rapidly making her position untenable or at least unprofitable. This was the situation on September 18, when the Japanese army, either intentionally or in self-defense, struck to defend its rights.

This may have no bearing upon what followed, but it is well to bear in mind the basic Chinese diplomacy and declared intentions towards utilizing every appropriate occasion to find a solution to her dispute with Japan over the 1915 Treaty. It is a semi-secret that at the London Naval Conference, the United States and Great Britain assured Japan of a free hand in Manchuria in exchange for a reduction of her fleet, thus destroying China's last hope of international support in her long drawn out fight to invalidate the 1915 Treaty. This return to the secret processes of old-fashioned diplomacy convinced the Chinese that their case against Japan was lost unless a situation was created that would compel international action before it was too late to save themselves. The ground for this action was prepared by China's election to a seat on the League Council and, it is significant that the attempt to destroy the South Manchuria Railway on the night of September 18 synchronized exactly with the opening session of the Council. Had adjournment over the week-end not taken place, the Council would have been confronted on Saturday morning with the Mukden incident and China's demand for intervention. How otherwise can the Chinese explain the alleged orders of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang commanding his armies to lay down their arms in the event of being attacked

by the Japanese? It is inconceivable that any ruler would surrender his capital, his arsenal, his air-fleet, his treasury and his yamen without a fight, unless assured he would receive prompt assistance from the outside. The only error in calculation was the week-end adjournment and the rapidity of the Japanese defense. Within forty-eight hours the little Japanese army was in complete control of the strategic centers of Manchuria and Marshal Chang's power was broken. When the League Council met on Monday, it faced the accomplished fact, with a hysterical Chinese Member shrieking for immediate application of sanctions against Japan.

China threw herself unreservedly into the arms of the League and demanded intervention, with the full knowledge that any international action would ultimately lead to a consideration of the 1915 Treaty. Japan was willing to accept the League's terms in all but one point, insisting upon China's promise to comply with the treaties as a basic condition to withdrawing into the railway zone. This was the one point that China would not accept. Anything, rather than face Japan alone over the validity of the Manchurian treaties. China stubbornly refuses to negotiate this matter with Japan unless supported by international observers, while Japan just as resolutely rejects any outside intervention in a dispute she considers as one that concerns only herself and China. In other words, the situation is an exact duplicate of the one created at the Washington Conference, only in this instance China threw her case into the League, her last and only hope for international intervention to compel Japan to get out of Manchuria.

With a full understanding that if the League accepts the adjudication of a dispute having its origin in the validity of a treaty extracted under duress it would kill its own usefulness, China insisted that the League dig its own grave. When the real facts of the situation filtered through to Geneva and the League began to understand what it all meant it began to back away from the precipice that yawned before it. The failure of the League to stop Japan, caused China's enthusiasm for this body rapidly to wane.

Right here, it is necessary to revert to the statement made by Dr. Wang at the Washington Conference and emphasize its significance. He said, in effect, that China is not concerned with the stability of existing international relations elsewhere in the world, and unless the League and the Powers stand with her against Japan over the validity of the 1915 Treaty, a "**still more dangerous precedent will be established with consequences upon the stability of international relations which cannot be estimated.**" In plain words, China will tear the whole world apart and drag other nations down to ruin before she will confront Japan alone and accept the treaty of 1915 as binding.

Compare the above declared policy of China with the following

statement given to the press at Nanking on October 6, by Dr. W. W. Yen, on his appointment as Chinese Minister to Washington.

"China is at the cross roads," he said. "One means following instinctively the rule of law and reason in international affairs. The other leads to the adoption of extremist ideas and measures which have little regard for the consequences. This road will be followed in disappointment and desperation. The decision and responsibility for the decision as to what road China will follow rests largely upon the attitude and actions of nations whose ideals and interests are seriously menaced by the militaristic violations of agreements designed to maintain peace."

Dr. W. W. Yen is a Northern politician affiliated with the Chang Hsueh-liang faction. Before commenting further on the above statement, it is well to ponder over the following extract from an editorial in *The Peking Leader* of September 24. This newspaper is, or rather was, the organ of the Chang Hsueh-liang Government.

"The Signatories of the Kellogg Peace Pact are indifferent because war has not been created by Japan's unwarranted invasion of Chinese territory. Public sentiment is being worked up and sooner or later, the Chinese nation, if it is going to remain one at all, will have to rise and create a rumpus to turn this international aggression into an international war—to conform to the requirements of the Kellogg Pact."

The Peking Leader, (since suppressed as the result of pressure from the Japanese Legation at Peking) interprets the more diplomatic utterances of Dr. Wang and Dr. Yen in understandable English. There never has been any doubt as to the certainty that China would create some incident that would involve other nations in her quarrel with Japan in order to force international action, once the Chinese became convinced that the League or the United States would not intervene to stop Japan. The only uncertainty was how, when, and where the incident would occur. For a time, it looked as though Tientsin might furnish the excuse, but that incident fizzled out owing to an old treaty provision prohibiting the approach of Chinese armies to within a specified distance of the port. Had it not been for this, the issue would have been created in the Northern port. Since then, it has become more and more evident that the League would not intervene further than to send a Commission of Inquiry to Manchuria, while all appeals to the United States to invoke the Kellogg and Nine Power Pacts have failed to bring the required results. Facing the loss of Manchuria and with all hope of foreign intervention gone, China had either to accept defeat and face Japan alone, or kick up such a rumpus as would "turn this international aggression into an inter-

national war" and force the application of the Peace Pacts and Article XVI of the Covenant.

So we come to Shanghai and the chain of events that led up to the night of January 28. It is unprofitable to follow in detail the unfolding of the tragedy now being enacted in the environs of this port. As in Manchuria, there are as many versions of what happened as there are observers and narrators. For the purposes of this article, it is safer to adhere to the report of the League Commission as the most impartial record of what led up to the explosion and what followed. Here again, there is the same conflict of evidence as to how the fight started.

It is generally accepted that the Japanese blundered, but there is this much be said in their favor. Neither the high officials of the Government in Tokyo or the big-business men of Japan desired to further complicate a situation that called for all their tact and diplomacy to surmount with dignity. Although the situation in Shanghai was ominous and loaded with dynamite, Tokyo confidently expected that it would be handled successfully by the small naval contingent assigned to protect lives and properties in co-operation with the forces of other nations. The blow-up on the night of January 28 was entirely unexpected in Tokyo and aroused considerable criticism and resentment against Admiral Shiosawa for not being able to prevent a situation that was clearly foreseen would lead to further embarrassing and dangerous complications.

Who was to blame? The Japanese present a clear-cut case, proving that they were attacked when they moved to take up the positions assigned to them and therefore acted in self-defense. The Chinese have an equally convincing case that the Japanese invaded Chinese territory and they simply defended their position. Both statements are supported by the testimony of unimpeachable witnesses. Both sides are right. The Governments of both sides however must be guided by the official reports of their own representatives and support them, if necessary, by force. Who is to be the judge?

We come to the story of the 19th Route Army and its part in precipitating the trouble. Here again, there are as many versions of the motives which influenced these troops to make a stand against the Japanese as there are stories of what followed. The following facts however stand out from the mass of rumors and help us to understand what it is all about. The 19th Route Army is composed of three Cantonese Divisions which have rendered a good account of themselves in the many campaigns they have taken part in. These troops were transferred from their own province to the Shanghai-Nanking area as part of the agreement that brought peace between Canton and Nanking in December last. The control of the Shanghai-

Nanking Railway district by this army was a pre-requisite to the Cantonese leaders coming to Nanking to participate in the Government and entrusting their safety to the promises of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. This army, garrisoning the Shanghai area, constituted a guarantee that in the event of further political trouble, the Cantonese leaders would not be forcibly detained by their Ningpo military colleague. That is all. There was no patriotism or high motives in their being here, simply a cold, calculated insurance against a repetition of the Hu Han-ming outrage, the guarantee of a safe and quick get-away to the protection of Shanghai in the event of a rupture.

The break came on January 25 over the Government's policy in regard to Japan. Mr. Eugene Chen, the new Foreign Minister and one of the Cantonese leaders, proposed the immediate severance of diplomatic relations with Japan to be followed by a declaration of war. General Chiang Kai-shek, who would have to do the fighting and who knew perhaps the limitations of his army and resources, rejected these proposals as too drastic. So the split came. Mr. Chen and Mr. Sun Fo finding themselves in opposition to the big military chief and fearing the usual termination to such differences of political opinion hastily left Nanking for the safer precincts of the International Settlement. Once more, Canton and Nanking were at odds, facing another civil war, but this time a Cantonese army was entrenched outside of Shanghai commanding the approaches to the city and port.

Here we have the familiar picture of a Chinese army from another province entrenched on the soil of another warlord's preserves, holding the premier city of China and the source of all government revenues as hostage for its own safety as well as that of its political leaders. The withdrawal of this army from the vicinity of Shanghai, or its return to its home province, meant the certain end of Canton's influence at Nanking and the finish of the Kuomintang party dictatorship. The departure of this army would automatically compel the hasty exit of Mr. Eugene Chen and Mr. Sun Fo and their followers from Shanghai and terminate their careers as national political figures. The army that dominates the Shanghai area, controls the purse strings of the treasury and dictates the personnel of the government. Chiang Kai-shek, in anticipation of trouble, whether with Canton or Japan, had moved his crack divisions to Loyang and was in no position to enforce his orders to the Cantonese. Unless the 19th Route Army could be induced to evacuate the Shanghai area, his sources of revenue would be cut off and his power handed over to his political enemies. If the 19th Route Army retired from their positions around Shanghai towards Nanking or Hangchow, it was a foregone conclusion that sooner or later they would come into conflict with Chiang's divis-

ions and be wiped out. The Canton army was therefore between the devil and the deep sea. They dared not move. There are stories to the effect that Chiang Kai-shek ordered them out but they refused to go. There are other stories that several thousand troops from Hangchow were sent to disarm them but on arrival threw in their lot with them. There are other stories, all irrelevant to the main facts. As long as the 19th Army remained entrenched around Shanghai, their political leaders were still in the ring and could dictate terms to Nanking. They held Shanghai and the army that holds this port holds the purse strings and the power of government in China. Chiang Kai-shek let himself out on the end of a limb when he allocated the Shanghai-Nanking area to the Cantonese and sent his own crack battalions to far-away Loyang. He may be the main figure in the government, but unless his army controls Shanghai, he is just one of the many war-lords out of luck.

There may be other excellent reasons to explain the resistance of the 19th Army, but after all is said, the fact remains that in the beginning, it was fighting for the only thing that makes war profitable in China and in doing so have transformed a sordid struggle for power and pelf into a patriotic war that may result in a real rebirth of the nation. In addition to these basic influences, there remains the undisputed fact that the Cantonese leaders who broke with Nanking on January 25, had declared for war with Japan. They came to Shanghai bitterly resentful of the other group which stood for peace, or, at least, for less drastic measures. Here they had their own army, ordered out by Chiang but with no place to go with any chance of escape from Chiang's divisions. By holding their ground, they retained a certain power that in time would have to be recognized. They stayed and dug themselves in. Perfectly natural, understandable and commendable. Is it fair to deduce that the Cantonese leaders, smarting under their defeat and in order to make their program stick, induced their army to resist Japan to the point where Chiang Kai-shek would have to give in, and fight Japan? If the Canton army was operating in the beginning as a unit of the National forces, why was not Generalissimo Chiang in command of such an important action? Is it possible that Chiang Kai-shek does not dare to entrust his person to the loyalty of his Cantonese divisions, who remember the trick he played on their idol, Hu Han-min? Chinese warfare probably has not changed overnight, and it is quite understandable that the Generalissimo of the Chinese armies would not care to move around without his own armies at his back.

Or, to leave this phase of the subject, is it logical to infer that the gallant resistance of the 19th Army is the direct result of a determined and set policy to provoke international intervention at all costs over Manchuria? The Chinese see Manchuria being

transformed into an autonomous state with no opposition from the outside Powers to check Japan and restore his patrimony to the Young Marshal. Did the Chinese, in conformity with their oft-expressed policy to compel international intervention, "**in disappointment and desperation and with little regard for the consequences,**" decide to take advantage of the explosive Shanghai situation to precipitate a world issue that would bring us all into the Manchurian mess? The answer to this question is found in every official and semi-official statement emanating from the Chinese Government since the night of January 28.

Mr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated on February 6:

"It is inconceivable that in considering the general situation brought about by the military aggression of Japan, the so-called Manchurian question can be treated separately from the question of Shanghai."

The following day, another statement to the same effect was made by Mr. Quo Tai-chi, vice-minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan issued a similar statement from Loyang on February 5, and added:

"If the Chinese Government had been willing to sign, like Yuan Shih-kai, treaties like the notorious Twenty One Demands, the whole affair would have been settled long ago.. Because we refuse to sign such treaties, Japan has attacked Mukden, Tsitsihar, Chinchow, Harbin and Jehol purely with the purpose of forcing China to surrender her sovereign rights under armed pressure. In view of the fact that the Chinese Government continues to remain firm in refusing to sign such treaties, Japan has decided to take further steps."

There is no record that Japan has asked China to sign any new treaties surrendering her sovereignty. Mr. Wang's statement is the Chinese way of saying that his government will never recognize the 1915 Treaty. The record to date, reveals that Japan has merely demanded that China live up to the treaties and agreements she has already signed.

General Tsai Ting-kai, Commanding the Chinese Army around Shanghai, concluding an interview published in the *North-China Daily News* (February 8) remarked:

"The remaining point emphasized by the Japanese Admiral was that 'Shanghai is an entirely separate issue from Manchuria.' The Admiral, I notice, failed to give his reasons. The Manchurian conquest is practically ended because Japan's ambitions there have been realized but the epilogue to the Manchurian show is being performed here."

Dr. W. W. Yen, at Geneva in his appeals to the Council has also insisted that the root of the Shanghai matter lies in Manchuria.

On February 15, a number of the Central Committee members of the Kuomintang, headed by Mr. Sun Fo, issued a circular telegram to the country urging what for all practical purposes amounts to a declaration of war, national support to 19th Route Army, a general offensive in the North to recover control of Manchuria, etc. and closing with the reminder that the Shanghai situation could not be treated separately from the Manchurian question. Up to the last minute in the negotiations which preceded the expiration of the final ultimatum of General Uyeda, the Chinese side insisted that the local situation could not be considered apart from Manchuria and that an international commission should take part in the settlement.

The real story of Shanghai remains to be told. It may never be told. It is too early for the world to pass judgment on who was responsible for what happened on the night of September 28. For the present the surface evidence would indicate that the Japanese Admiral exceeded his instructions, underestimated the fighting qualities and power of resistance of the Chinese troops and attempted to carry through a minor military operation with an insufficient naval landing force, creating a situation so fraught with danger to the prestige of Japan that the army had to be dispatched to extricate him from his peril and preserve the honor of the nation. The Japanese blundered, but the evidence is irrefutable that they walked right into a Chinese trap skilfully prepared in advance to create a situation that would focus world attention upon Shanghai and force international intervention against Japan in the hope of bringing Manchuria into the picture.

The 19th Route Army is worthy of every praise for its gallant resistance, even though it was against a much inferior, but better equipped force. It has retrieved the honor of the Chinese fighting forces and shown to the world that the Chinese will fight. They may have been animated by a spirit of pure patriotism in defending their native land against the invasion of Japanese armed forces. If so, and a Cantonese army on its own initiative will defend another province against outside aggression, there is hope for China. It marks the beginning of a new era in the Far East, the evidence of a new spirit that will save China from extinction as a nation. All honor to brave men!

On the other hand, all the eulogies and admiration expressed for the 19th Route Army does not detract in any way from the simple statement that it dared not retreat in any direction from Shanghai without encountering the armies of hostile war-lords allied with Chiang Kai-shek. Withdrawal from their position around Shanghai and repatriation to their native province meant the end of Cantonese influence at Nanking. Their political leaders were here in Shanghai demanding war with Japan and urging their army to sit tight and fight it out. And behind it all was the

great prize of Shanghai, the only place in China left to loot, the treasure house which furnishes sixty-five per cent of the revenues of the government. Patriotism is a wonderful thing, but practical politics is quite synonymous with this virtue in China.

In this land of make-believe, it is well to keep the proper perspective on things. The Chinese diplomats and statesmen have placed on record on various occasions their government's policy towards Manchuria. They refuse to recognize the legality of treaties and agreements which do not conform to their ideas of sovereignty and nationalism and before they will acknowledge the validity of the 1915 Treaty, they will carry out their threat to create a situation whose consequences upon the stability of international relations cannot be estimated. Convinced that the League or the United States will not go to war with Japan or apply economic sanctions against her for acting in self-defense and confronted with having to face Japan alone over an issue she has for seventeen years sought to shoulder on to other nations, China in sheer desperation and disappointment has provoked what she hopes will be a world crisis, without any thought of the consequences upon world peace or the stability of Europe.

There is another side to this Manchurian picture. For the moment, there is no Chinese Government, but such as there is, its official spokesmen are all henchmen of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Loh Wen-kan, held the same position in the Mukden Government up to September 18. Dr. W. W. Yen, China's representative at Geneva, is a Peking official of the old Northern Group, affiliated with the Young Marshal, while Dr. Wellington Koo, Chang Hsueh-liang's right-hand man has been appointed to accompany the League Commission to investigate Manchurian affairs. The key positions in China's foreign relations for the moment are therefore held, not by Kuomintang officials, but by representatives of the Young Marshal, the Co-Ruler of China, whose sole object is to regain control over the province and its revenues.

In all the publicity, propaganda and official statements over Manchuria emanating from the Chinese side, not a word has been said, not a promise has been made, that the rights of the peoples of the Three Eastern Provinces to a voice in their own government are to be recognized. Restoration of Manchuria to China, simply means its return to the rule of Chang Hsueh-liang and the further enslavement of its people to the yoke of a pitiless bandit oilgarchy. Were there any indication, however slight, that the rights of the people of Manchuria to a share in their own government were to be recognized, China's case against Japan would be immeasurably strengthened. But as long as the whole weight of Chinese diplomacy is concentrated upon restoring the dictatorship of a war-lord and his

rapacious armies, and the world is expected to intervene to perpetuate such an injustice, there is little hope that any sympathy will be wasted on a system which is repugnant to every right-thinking man.

The daily news aspects of the developing Shanghai situation will absorb the attention of the world and overshadow the fundamentals of the real problem. If China is successful in her diplomacy and propaganda, the whole world will be drawn into a war over a purely local incident in order to gain her ends in Manchuria and escape having to recognize a treaty which rightly or wrongly she rejects because she claims it was extracted under duress. So we come back to where we started, to a Spring day in May, 1915, when a high Chinese Foreign Office official confided to the Japanese Minister at Peking that the Manchurian Treaty would be expedited and at the same time provide a plausible excuse for the President of China to sign it, if Japan would only hand in a little ultimatum that would save their face. The astute Japanese Minister, who ought to have known better, jumped at the bait and was hooked. He placed a weapon in the hands of the Chinese that they have since employed to justify their refusal to recognize the treaty.

China will never admit the truth concerning her invitation to Japan to send in the ultimatum, and will insist upon dragging the whole world into the dispute. If she finds that she must settle with Japan without outside assistance, rather than face Japan alone, and recognize the 1915 Treaty, she will go down to ruin and carry the rest of the world with her. This is the real issue behind the Shanghai incident.—G.B.R.

Fundamentals

(By George Bronson Rea in *The Far Eastern Review*, Feb., 1932)

Wars are rarely precipitated overnight. It takes time to create suspicion, provoke resentment, engender hatred, marshal public opinion and fire the hearts of a people to the point where they are ready to fight for something that does not immediately affect their own security. It took three years of violent newspaper misrepresentation, invective and vilification to convince the American people it was their duty to go to war with Spain to redress the wrongs of Humanity in Cuba. Even then, it could never have been done, if the battleship *Maine* had not been destroyed in Havana harbor, by an explosion whose causes are still shrouded in mystery. Ninety-five per cent of the stories in the American press about Spanish atrocities and inhumanity had no foundation in fact. Invented in the fertile imagination of Cuban *laborantes* and confided in deep secrecy to sympathetic American war-correspondents they were wired to their home offices as the latest news from the "front." It worked. It always works.

It took the same length of time to find a slogan that would move the American people to participate in the Great War, redress the wrongs of the Belgians, liberate the German people from the yoke of their military taskmasters, destroy the Divine Right of Kings and make the world safe for Democracy. Again, it worked. We then sent as American army to Siberia to make Asia safe for Bolshevism. That also worked. It then became our bounden duty to ally ourselves morally with our Asiatic "Sister Republic" to put an end to autocracy and militarism in this part of the world. We broke down the "imperialistic" Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in order that the new democracy of Russia should have free scope for expansion and provide republican China with the most unembarrassed opportunity to develop into a first class power worthy of our assistance in making this part of the world safe and secure for the principles that underlie our conception of things-as-they-ought-to-be. Our Sister Republic however, had her own fish to fry. Solely intent upon punishing and humiliating Japan, China hailed with joy the prospect of duplicating her secret diplomacy of 1896 when she unloaded upon Russia the task of fighting her battles. Instead of putting her own house in order and proving worthy of the confidence reposed in her ability to establish a modern state and taking over her international responsibilities, China utilized her freedom from outside intervention to indulge in a series of ferocious civil wars that split the country into several independent states which, by the courtesy of the Powers, are still recognized as a political entity in order to facilitate the conduct of international

affairs. Safe in the arms of the League, protected by the Nine Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact, China settled down to a prolonged period of internal warfare, abrogation of treaties and disregard for the rights of other nations,

Convinced that in due course, America would fight Japan over the supremacy of the Pacific, the Open Door or some other issue connected with the preservation of her integrity, China has conducted a violent propaganda calculated to inflame American opinion against Japan. Americans have deluded themselves into a belief that in some way their national honor and self-respect is involved in the preservation of principles they expect Japan religiously to uphold while accepting as a matter of course Russia's cynical disregard and violation of the same doctrines.

The climax that any school-boy could have foreseen came on the night of September 18 and from that date the process of marshalling world opinion against Japan has been in steady progress. Handicapped from the outset in presenting and explaining her case in the face of universal prejudice and suspicion, Japan was condemned as a violator of treaties, an outlaw nation that had lost all sense of moral and treaty obligations. That China had steadily violated her treaties with Japan and provoked the latter to act in self-defense, counted for nothing before the more important fact that Japan had violated her treaties with the United States and other Powers.

The world has a short memory. As far back as 1927, when the Nationalist Government abrogated its treaty with little Belgium, Chiang Kai-shek announced that this abrogation was the first of others to follow. "*We will execute no treaties such as were signed by former governments, nor will we at any time recognize any treaties or agreements which were made with other nations by any government in China previous to that of the Nationalist forces.*" Faithfully adhering to this program of treaty denunciation, the Nationalist Government has been encouraged by the passive attitude of the United States and Great Britain to believe that it could get away with it. Only when Japan struck to defend her vital interests in Manchuria, did the rest of the world suddenly recall that there was such a thing as the sanctity of treaties and its wrath fell, not upon treaty-breaking China, but upon Japan. In protecting herself against the violation of a treaty vital to her existence, Japan automatically became the violator of other treaties.

A nation that sees itself forced into a corner by the operation of treaties which circumscribe its powers of defense while its traditional foe is permitted full freedom to pursue predatory policies without a word of protest on the part of other Powers, will sooner or later assert its right to self-preservation. Technically, Japan is wrong, but to a man her people believe they are

right. As far as Manchuria is concerned, Japan has an exceptionally strong legal case that commands respect and unprejudiced consideration. China has an equally strong moral case, but one which can not be brought before an international tribunal with any hope of receiving a favorable verdict. Once the validity of a treaty extracted under duress comes within the purview of the League of Nations or the World Court for revision, the whole post-war international structure is menaced with collapse. If Japan admits that it is a matter even for discussion, the precedent will be created for a score of other nations to demand the reopening of issues now closed through the application of force. The Chinese Government and the Chinese people adhering tenaciously to their refusal to admit the validity of the 1915 Treaty, demand that the rest of the world come to their aid to compel its revision. Rather than face Japan alone and settle her dispute by mutual agreement, China would drag the whole world down to ruin to achieve her ends.

Leaving aside the economic and legal aspects of the Manchurian problem, the Chinese case is weakened by the non-existence of a government that can discharge its international duties and guarantee its own territory and Japan against attack or aggression from the direction of Urga. China has made no effort to regain possession of Mongolia, or defend herself against the Red menace. International law justifies Japan in violating China's territory in order to protect herself while there is yet time to do so. A year hence, it would have been too late.

It is easy enough to condemn the military leaders of Japan for taking the initiative away from the ministry of foreign affairs and arrogating to themselves the right to dictate the policy of the government. When a nation sees its security whittled away to the vanishing point and its powers of resistance undermined by a long drawn out ineffectual policy of conciliation which surrenders its right to defend vital interests in territories where its very life is at stake, the time must arrive when those whose duty it is to defend the nation will call a halt.

Japan's military leaders are no different from those of other nations. No British government, no matter how liberal or how radical, would dare set aside the two-power naval standard of the Admiralty. There is a limit to disarmament, conciliation and surrender of the right of self-defense even in Great Britain. The same holds true in France. The French people demand security, preferably through pacts which bring us all in on her side in any future war. Failing this, they wisely provide their own security and woe betide any government that would run counter to the basic defense plans of the General Staff. Even in the United States, there is a limit beyond which no Congress

would dare go in disregarding the advice of the General Staff of the Army and Navy in any matter affecting the security of the nation. Should the day ever arrive when the security and national existence of the United States is jeopardized by the conciliatory policy of a pacifist cabinet or Congress, our experiment in democratic government will also give way to a military dictatorship.

It is popular at the present time to condemn the Japanese military leaders and ignore the reasons which compelled them to retain a supervisory direction over the external policies of their government. Fifteen years ago, their attitude could be readily justified ; to-day, when peace pacts rule the world, their interference in political affairs cannot even be explained. Of all nations, Japan is the only one that world opinion refuses to concede the same right of self-defense that the United States and Great Britain lay down as a fundamental condition to their adherence to the war renunciation pacts. Yet, if fair-minded observers would remember only the high points of events of the past thirty-five years, they will understand something of the motives which explain much that is otherwise condemnatory and contradictory.

Deprived of the legitimate fruits of their victory over China in 1895 by the intervention of the three strongest military powers ; humiliated further by seeing China hand Manchuria over to Russia, forcing them to fight another war to preserve their independence ; the military leaders of Japan then watched Russia enter into stupendous preparations to resume the conflict. This war of *revanche* was scheduled to take place in 1912. To keep pace with Russia's open preparations to regain her lost prestige in Eastern Asia, Japan was compelled year by year to increase her military establishment to the point where it became a serious drain on her resources. At no time from 1905 to 1914 did Japan dare to relax her vigilance. During the Great War, the Japanese military leaders took advantage of the opportunity to impose a new treaty upon China in order to strengthen their strategic position and in so doing incurred the enmity of other powers. As usual with Asiatics, the Japanese demands were all embracing, in order to get the one thing they wanted. They got just that and no more, and from the evidence now available, the Chinese made no objection to conceding this point.

In order to maintain the doctrine of the Open Door, the Consortium Powers forced Japan to surrender her outer line of strategic defense against the menace from the direction of Urga and lay herself open to a flank attack in South Manchuria by the forces of the Soviet. They tore down Japan's defenses but made no agreement to come to her assistance in the event her security was endangered. They went further and destroyed the one bulwark

for peace in the Far East by cancelling the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, leaving Russia to pursue her policies in Asia without fear of restraint. Rightly or wrongly, legally or illegally, by force or by persuasion, by hook or by crook, Japan consolidated her position in Manchuria. Viewed as an isolated episode, her tactics were indefensible, but when considered in the light of previous events and subsequent revelations of China's secret alliance with Russia which brought on the war of 1904, it is difficult for any unprejudiced mind to wholly condemn Japan. In an understanding with Great Britain and France for the defense of Allied war aims in Siberia, Japan was to take over the Trans-Siberian Railway, occupy Vladivostok and be compensated by a slice of Siberian territory that would have enabled her to defend the Far East against the spread of Bolshevism. America intervened to deprive Japan of this opportunity to strengthen her position by obtaining a foothold on the mainland, dispatching an army to see that there should be no interference with the internal affairs of Bolshevik Russia. Defeated again at a great cost to the nation, and finding themselves in disrepute, the military leaders of Japan refrained from further interference in the affairs of the nation and left the formulation and direction of foreign policies to the politicians. It is needless to go through the weary story beginning with the Washington Conference, the signing of the Nine Power Treaty and ending with the ratification of the Kellogg Peace Pact. Everything the Japanese army had fought to retain for the defense of the nation was gradually surrendered in an honest attempt to gain the good will and support of the world. They remained passive while Russia took over Mongolia. They saw China enter into another secret agreement with Moscow and the country come under the domination of Soviet agents. They saw communism rear its head in Central China and convert the Yangtsze Valley into a Soviet stronghold. They saw the Mongol tribes organized into modern armies and trained "to a gnat's eyebrow" under efficient Soviet direction. They saw the creation of a vast Soviet army with a special Far Eastern department based on Irkutsk and Chita. They have watched the development of the Five Year Plan and Russia's open preparations to assert her dominance in Eastern Asia. They see the erection of a 1,250,000 ton steel mill at Kuznetsk in the Altais with another enormous 2,500,000 ton mill in the Urals. These plants are nearing completion. The Trans-Siberian railway is being double-tracked and improved. The Siberian Turkestan Railway encircling the Far Western provinces of China and Mongolia is completed. In another year, Russia would be in an invulnerable strategic position in Northern and Central Asia. Russia was not a member of the League or a signatory to the Nine Power Treaty. China could not and would

not discharge her obligations and defend her own territory. The menace to Japan was real and imminent. This is the picture as seen by the military leaders of Japan.

They saw China enter into a program of rights recovery through the abrogation and violation of treaties, culminating in a final effort to compel them to surrender the 1915 Treaty on which their rights in Manchuria are based. They saw China declare an economic war to enforce her diplomacy. They saw their goods confiscated, outrages committed upon their nationals and all attempts to obtain redress rejected. Within a year, two years at the most, the Soviet would have completed its plans in Siberia. With China already half communized and Mongolia as part of the Soviet system, the outlook for the Japanese military leaders was far from bright. They saw their investments and trade in Manchuria ruined by an outrageous system of confiscation and taxation. They saw the province impoverished by the issuance of billions of worthless paper notes exchanged for the crops of the farmers which were sold for gold to maintain a bandit oligarchy and its formidable armies. The other Powers, seemingly indifferent to their interests in China, were willing to surrender everything rather than incur the enmity of the Chinese. Even Japan was willing to surrender all her rights in China proper to placate Chinese nationalism, but was told that nothing short of abrogation of the 1915 Treaty and the withdrawal of her troops from Manchuria would satisfy Nanking. Japan's policy of conciliation failed. The military leaders found the nation with its back against the wall, their hands tied by peace pacts, treaties and League commitments which forbade any move that could not be justified by the law of self-defense. It matters little who started the rumpus on the night of September 18. The Chinese assert that it was a put-up-job. Maybe it was. It happened, Japan invoked the right of self-defense and the world is faced with the accomplished fact.

Let us also admit that Japan blundered, but she took an even chance with a nation that rejected any direct negotiation over a vital issue that could not be settled by pacific measures. It is useless for China and uninformed public opinion to insist that the validity of the 1915 Treaty is a matter for League interference, international arbitration or even for discussion. To admit the Chinese contention is to invite a concerted onslaught on the Versailles Treaty and many other pacts upon which world peace and stability is founded. To even expose these treaties to any precedent that might invalidate their provisions or destroy their efficacy is to invite disaster. If China is upheld, it is only a question of time when the whole post-war international edifice will crumble and another conflict wipe out the last vestiges of Western Civilization.

The question is therefore one that concerns solely China and Japan. China's refusal to discuss the matter with Japan while insisting upon the latter's surrender of her rights and employing economic pressure and confiscation of Japanese property to enforce her viewpoint, together with other acts which clearly reveal her intentions to drive Japan out of Manchuria, are, for all practical purposes equivalent to a declaration of war. Under cover of the peace pacts and the League Covenant, China has been at war with Japan since last July. From the military viewpoint and strict interpretation of the treaties, Japan is the aggressor. There the matter rests. Unless the other Powers are willing to establish the precedent that will undermine and destroy the validity of their own imposed treaties on other states and thus hasten the day of reckoning in a discontented Europe, they dare not comply with China's impassioned appeal to interfere in her dispute with Japan over the legality of the 1915 Treaty.—G.B.R.

The Difficulty

(By George Bronson Rea in *The Far Eastern Review*, Feb., 1932)

A war that is not a war is now in progress. The world is face to face with the ages-old problem of determining the aggressor when both sides to the dispute appeal to the law of self-defense to justify their disregard of the Pact of Paris. In self-defense, Japan is protecting the lives and properties of her nationals in China through armed intervention while the armies of China are defending their soil against invasion. The Kellogg Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy left to each nation to define for itself the right of self-defense and furnished no machinery to determine the aggressor or sanctions or methods to bring pressure to bear upon a violator of the treaty.

When two nations at war allege that they are fighting in self-defense, thus making difficult if not impossible for outside powers to determine who is the aggressor, intervention or the application of sanctions can only complicate the situation and precipitate a world catastrophe. As every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion, China is eminently justified in resisting the armed intervention and invasion of her territory by Japan. On the other hand, it has become more and more recognized under international law that violations of other States in the interest of self-preservation are excused in cases of necessity only. As both China and Japan can make out a strong case under the above principles, the equities of the war are not clear enough to warrant the application of positive measures by outside powers to stop the conflict.

The difficulties surrounding the implementation of the Pact of Paris are very clearly and forcibly brought out in the latest issue of "International Conciliation," the monthly bulletin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In an article entitled "What Follows The Pact of Paris," Mr. John B. Whitton, Professor of International Law at Princeton University, shows how the pact can be implemented and made effective by the enforcement of economic sanctions against the aggressor state.

The argument is openly in favor of the United States joining the League of Nations or at least of entering into full and harmonious co-operation with this body and will be hailed as a most important contribution to the campaign to bring America into the League. In view of what is happening in Shanghai, Professor Whitton's exposition of the problem of self-defense is of special interest and importance in attempting to clarify the difficulty in applying the pact. He says: "Closely allied with the question of fixing the aggressor is the problem of self-defense. This matter

is of great importance to-day. Formerly, when all wars were *prima facie* licit, it was really immaterial whether a war was aggressive or defensive. Both were legitimate. Both were equally "just," and both required of non-belligerents an attitude of impartiality towards the warring parties. But to-day, self-defense, individual or collective, is the last refuge of war. Furthermore, in case of an illicit war among League members, an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents is no longer required. In some cases, impartiality would violate the Covenant.

"It is now well-established under the Pact of Paris that a war of defense is an exception to the promise not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy. This exception was further complicated by Great Britain's alleged extension of the right of self-defense in the so-called 'British Monroe Doctrine,' and by the view adopted by our Senate that our own Monroe Doctrine is based upon self-defense—that a war made in defense of the Monroe Doctrine would be an exception to the Pact.* According to some authors, the exception of self-defense has emasculated the Pact for, in their opinion, legally any nation may make war and escape a violation of the Pact merely by declaring that it is fighting in self-defense.

"The subject is too complex for adequate treatment here, but it would seem that these difficulties have been over-emphasized. It is true that the Pact itself sets up no definition of self-defense. It envisages no machinery for testing the claim that a given war comes within the exception. But almost all of the parties to the Pact are also parties to the Covenant. Thus for most States self-defense is carefully regulated as a part of the League system. In fact, one author has suggested ironically that the best solution for this difficulty is for the United States to join the League of Nations.

"As regards League members, self-defense is subjected to extensive supervision. At least three checks against war, including a war in self-defense, have been set up, and may be divided into measures of prevention, moratorium, and retrospection. *Preventive measures* include the obligation to submit all disputes liable to lead to a rupture—whether a matter of self-defense or not—to examination by the League. If the parties do not accept judicial or arbitral settlement, then the matter goes to the Council for investigation and report. If the report is unanimous, no member

*"The United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as a part of its national security and defense. Under the right of self-defense allowed by the treaty must necessarily be included the right to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, which is a part of our system of national defense." Report of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 70, part 2, p. 1730.

may make war against a State accepting the report. In addition, the League possesses divers means, and enjoys a high authority, for acting to avoid war. *Moratorium*: whatever happens, member States may not make war until three months after a report of the Council. And even in such case of a licit war, the Council, under Article 11, can act effectively to restore peace. *Retrospection*: even if a member declares war, claiming to act in self-defense, his action may be reviewed *après coup*. That a member of the League cannot, by alleging self-defense, act with impunity, was shown graphically in the Greco-Bulgar affair. League members are not free to define self-defense. If one of them acts in self-defense, he does so at peril. An international body examines the question of whether the claim is valid. In short, a type of international control exists to prevent the abuse of the doctrine of self-defense.

"Naturally this system of control of self-defense does not obtain for non-members. Thus the problem, if the alleged aggressor is not a member of the League, is less simple. We can hardly agree with Mr. Kellogg that public opinion alone would prevent an abuse of the exception of self-defense,* although no doubt it would have a beneficial effect. Certain defects must be admitted. There is no clear and adequate definition of self-defense in international law. Nevertheless, for the American continent, there exists the Pan-American Treaty of Conciliation, whose effect should be to postpone war. Furthermore, legally minded critics of the Pact have exaggerated certain difficulties. Surely upon the State resorting to war rests the burden of proving that its action is in conformity with self-defense. Some rules of international law governing self-defense do exist.† It would be absurd to claim, for example, that the United States could declare war on another nation in order to annex certain rich oil lands, and allege she was fighting in self-defense. The contention that we would be our own judge in the matter of self-defense, although made on high authority, seems too strong. It would not apply to us if we agreed to arbitrate the matter. If a dispute arose between us and another American State as to whether we had acted in self-defense, we would be obliged to submit the matter for review to the Pan-American Conciliation Commission. Finally, we are bound by international law, under which there are certain limits to the exercise of the

* "Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense. *If it has a good case, the world will applaud and not condemn its action.*" (Italics ours.) American note of June 23, 1928. Shotwell, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

† For example, see Oppenheim, *International Law*, 4th ed. (McNair), Vol. I, p. 257: "It becomes more and more recognized that violations of other States in the interest of self-preservation are excused in cases of *necessity only*."

right of self-defense. It would be equally unreasonable to claim that since every treaty is subject to the exception known as *rebus sic stantibus*, and since each State remains its own judge of whether the exception, under which the treaty would lapse, is applicable, then no treaty has any force or utility !

" It should be added that the proposed processes of intercession, conference and consultation, if adopted, would tend to cut down immensely the possible cases of unregulated self-defense. Such measures should enable our government to distinguish between a real case of self-defense and that in which it was alleged as a pretext for aggression. Finally, the assurance given by the American Government that it would itself take positive measures against the malefactor would make it less likely that States in fear of attack would feel impelled to act in 'aggressive self-defense.'

" We submit, then, that the problem of self-defense is not an unsurmountable obstacle to our plan for making the Pact of Paris effective. In most cases, the State making war would be a member of the League, and thus prevented from alleging self-defense with impunity. As for States outside the League, the self-respect of governments, the fear of the sanction of public opinion, the possibility of concerted action taken against an aggressor, especially with our collaboration, and finally the existence of some limitations in international law ought to discourage abuse. And if worst comes to worst, and the allegation of one, or even both parties, that they are fighting in self-defense, makes it impossible for the President to determine the Pact-violator, no harm will be done, for, finding that the equities of the war were not clear, or that the identity of the aggressor was uncertain, our country would merely refrain from applying positive measures."

A Sane Outlook

The North-China Daily News, Shanghai, Feb. 15, 1932)

On Lieutenant-General K. Uyeda, the Commander of the newly-arrived Japanese forces, lays a heavy responsibility. His attitude, as expressed in the interview given to the representatives of this and other journals yesterday, shows a sane appreciation of the obligations imposed by military considerations and by a humane public opinion. He may, with all the necessary reserve which the crisis demands, be said to have built effectively on the foundations which Vice-Admiral Nomura diffidently laid on Friday. He looks for a possible peaceful solution with due regard for the interests of Shanghai. He does not blink the dangers of the warlike situation now created. He is well provided, physically and materially, to deal with them. All the more reason, therefore, can there be hope that, at this eleventh hour, the growing desire for avoidance of further destruction may find fulfilment, precarious though that hope may be. On landing, General Uyeda issued a short statement intended plainly to link up his expedition with the operations of Rear-Admiral Shiosawa. The device was natural. It need not be too closely examined. The great need at the moment is to discover the ways and means to the extrication of Shanghai from the devastating operations of contending armies, not to discuss acrimoniously the cause of past events. Therefore it is sufficient merely to register disagreement with the suggestion that Admiral Shiosawa's action on January 28 was in essence defensive. Later, no doubt, that point will come under review, in appropriate setting. General Uyeda would not be the man he is if he were to give at this moment the slightest hint of feeling embarrassed by the events which have brought him here. He has been able, by the deft combination of a gesture of friendship and an unmistakable parade of strength, to point out clearly the path to peace.

It would be folly to believe that his way could be chosen with alacrity by those for whom his words were plainly intended. The events of the last fortnight have undoubtedly awokened such feelings of military elation in the Chinese troops that—not unnaturally—they, and especially their newly-discovered supporters, are disinclined to perceive the advantages of a prudent recognition of hard military facts. There has been a definite realization by responsible Chinese business men of the seriousness of mistaking a gallant resistance for proof of a capacity to stem the tide of the advance of a modern, fully-equipped and adequate military force of all arms. Various circumstances—political, psychological, temperamental and material—have contributed to limit the effectiveness of this commonsense argument. Is it possible that General Uyeda's

statement will reinforce that argument to good purpose ? The 19th Route Army requires to be saved from itself. If it could be permitted to withdraw from the line which it has so gallantly held, it would be saved—and honourably saved—to earn the recognition of its countrymen for having given a new meaning to Chinese valour. The ignorance of the general public regarding the exact significance of the orderly disembarkation which has taken place during the week-end should not be exploited to make the officers and men of the 19th Route Army the victims of their own glamour.

General Uyeda shows clearly that Vice-Admiral Nomura spoke with strict accuracy when he emphasized that the Government of Japan had enjoined on them both the exercise of the utmost caution in their operations here. The door to diplomatic discussion is not closed. If there could be a withdrawal from Chapei of the troops whose presence there has drawn upon that place the horrors of bombardment and bombing a great point would be gained. It seems surprising, to all except those with bitter experience of the waywardness of Chinese politics, that, even now, no real effort seems to have been made to reduce the authority under which the Chinese troops are fighting, or rather defending themselves from attack, to a clear, understandable, tangible entity. The tragedy of the situation lies, not so much in the carnage and the ruin of which Shanghai has been the mournful witness, as in the fact that the men and women who have suffered have suffered under no apparent leadership and without the opportunity to look to such leadership for guidance, encouragement or the order to desist from a patently hopeless adventure. This has, to some extent, been a reproach to the Japanese commanders in that their operations have thus been deprived of a purpose. General Uyeda seems to perceive that difficulty, but even he cannot remove it, and even he must—albeit more effectively and, therefore, more humanely—uphold it, unless from the ranks of Chinese leaders there comes the embodiment of real authority competent to give undertakings and, having given them, to see that they are observed. There is time, but it is very fleeting. The Japanese Commander intimates that he is not out to strike before he has tested the power of persuasion. The interval, however, is merely that required by a modern force in disposing itself for action. It can be used on the other side for a rapid mobilisation of the elements of peaceful discussion. This implies a readiness to eschew camouflage, evasion and procrastination. Foreign friends are available to assist. There must be no misunderstanding of the realities. Will the genuine leaders of China bestir themselves and act ?

Misguided Partiality

By H. G. W. Woodhead, C.B.E.

(*Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury*, Feb. 18, 1932)

The motives inspiring the Council of the League of Nations in despatching its latest Note to Japan are unexceptionable. But the method it has adopted of trying to end the Sino-Japanese conflict is open to considerable criticism. It appears to assume, in the first place, that the entire blame for the present situation rests with Japan, and that the choice whether hostilities shall or shall not continue rests solely in her hands. She alone is requested to heed the world's entreaties, and not to aggravate the situation in Shanghai or other parts of China.

The Council's Note, therefore, appears to prejudge many of the issues between China and Japan, which have yet to be investigated by the League Commission. And it may be said without fear of contradiction that the attempt to saddle Japan with the entire responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the Shanghai area is not consistent with the Report submitted to the League Council by the Foreign Diplomatic and Consular authorities, at its own request. That Report, it may be recalled, stated that the Japanese Defence Sector included not only the Northeastern area of the Settlement, but "also, from the point of view of the Defence Committee, an area outside the Settlement," the limits of which were set forth in detail. It further asserts that the Japanese Marines "met with resistance on the part of the Chinese regular troops when occupying this sector."

Reasonable Doubt

There must therefore remain a reasonable doubt in the mind of any fair-minded observer whether the Japanese, on the night of January 28th, in fact attempted to do more than the British forces had done the same afternoon. And though, if they had encountered armed resistance from Chinese troops, it is improbable that on this occasion the British forces would have fought their way to their defence line, or resorted to such drastic action as was subsequently employed by the Japanese, one can well imagine that in 1927, when adequate British forces of all arms were in our midst, they would not have submitted to a preliminary rebuff.

Be that as it may, it seems rash and provocative to assume that Japan has been wholly in the wrong, or that she has any intention of retaining territory gained by violence. The Japanese have admittedly made many and grievous blunders in their handling of the local situation. But they have suffered great and prolonged pro-

vocation. And the peace of Shanghai depends, if not to the same extent, to a very large extent, upon the attitude and conduct of the Chinese authorities. If a "noble gesture" is demanded of Japan, the same gesture should, it seems to me, be required of the Chinese.

War and Weapons

It has been constantly laid to Japan's charge that she, alone of the two parties to the present dispute, has violated international Pacts and Covenants. It appears to be overlooked in many quarters that while China was appealing to the League to restrain Japan's military operations in Manchuria, she was herself conducting a form of warfare equally damaging throughout the country. I refer, of course, to the boycott. "The best weapon China possesses," Mr. Wang Ching-wei is reported to have said in a statement issued on Tuesday night, "is the severance of economic relations with Japan, and she intends to utilize this weapon to the fullest extent."

Admitting that Mr. Wang is correct, and that it is a "weapon," it is difficult to see how China can claim that she comes before the League as an entirely innocent victim of Japanese aggression on this occasion. The League itself, in its Covenant, regards the severance of "all trade and economic relations" as the first step in a war to bring a recalcitrant member to account by force. And other Powers than Japan, with even less reason, have been victimized by this particular "weapon" as employed in China.

Why Not a Note to China?

With every reasonable effort of the League Council to terminate hostilities in this neighbourhood the entire community must sympathise. But the Note of February 16 to Tokyo ought, in my opinion, to have been supplemented by an equally strong Note to Nanking (or Loyang). The League Council will render a great disservice to the cause of peace if it creates the impression that in an emergency of this kind the only rôle it intends to assume is that of calling off one party, regardless of the provocation given by the other. Its one-sided appeal on this occasion is likely to encourage a more intransigent attitude on the part of the Chinese, and correspondingly to stiffen the attitude of the Japanese. And it would be unfortunate, in the extreme, should this be its effect, just when Japan's Diplomats seem willing to bring local hostilities to an end on the basis of mutual Chinese and Japanese concessions.

From an interview reported in our last issue it would appear that the Japanese have indicated their willingness to withdraw all their forces within their original defence area and undertake not

to follow up the Chinese forces, if the latter withdraw to "a reasonable distance." If a compromise on this basis were reached, the way would be open for a settlement by negotiation, and Shanghai would be freed from those dangers which it experienced in a minor but none the less tragic form in the early hours of yesterday morning.

A Naive Assumption

The League Council's Note to Tokyo is certain to make negotiations on the above lines more difficult, if it does not render them entirely abortive. The naive assumption that it rests entirely with Japan whether the situation in Shanghai is aggravated is calculated to irritate Japanese public opinion, which is likely to be especially sensitive on the eve of a General Election, when the rival political parties will naturally try to outvie each other as the champions of national honour. It is, moreover, calculated to encourage the Chinese to endeavour to evade responsibility for what happens here in the near future.

As an impartial body the League Council should obviously seek to quell the militant spirit on both sides, not on the part of Japan alone. And Tuesday's Note to Tokyo would have been far more likely to achieve this result had a Note warning China of her responsibilities in this locality been addressed simultaneously to her Government. I do not think that any impartial investigating body would find either side in the present dispute deserved a monopoly of the blame. Why, then, attempt to throw upon Japan a monopoly of the responsibility ?

Why Intervention is Impossible

By H. G. W. Woodhead, C.B.E.

(*Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury, Feb. 8, 1932*)

It is, I suppose, not surprising that during a week of stress and strain such as that through which we have just passed, Chinese readers of the Foreign Press should regard any comment on the situation that does not abuse or revile the Japanese as unfriendly to their own people. Any attempt to deal with the situation realistically is resented. The veriest claptrap which ignores the realities of the position is welcomed, so long as it is anti-Japanese. Chinese readers of this journal, for instance, instead of violently attacking my articles would have expressed the warmest approval of them had I so far ignored the facts as to write in favour of forcible intervention on the part of America and Great Britain to compel Japan to suspend her military operations in this area.

I have tried to view the situation realistically. I predicted before the crisis became really acute that Japan meant business, and, when she had started operations in Shanghai, that nothing would deter her from going through with them. I have expressed disapproval of many of the methods employed by the Japanese, but I never shared the illusion that was cherished in some quarters that foreign intervention would stay Japan's hand. Let me give my reasons for this view.

Japan's Strong Position

It seemed clear after the delivery of the Shanghai Ultimatum that the Japanese Government had decided upon a showdown regarding the activities of the anti-Japanese organizations, that in adopting this attitude it had the support of the entire nation, and that it would not shrink from employing whatever naval or military forces might be required to see it through. Japan possesses the third strongest Navy in the world, and the peace strength of her Army is only exceeded by that of France, Italy, Poland, Russia and Spain. She could mobilize within a week, and her geographical position would enable her to strike at any point in the Far East weeks before any other nation or group of nations could assemble the naval or military forces necessary to offer effective resistance.

Would it be likely that Great Britain, for instance, with nothing larger than an armoured cruiser east of Suez, would be guilty of the folly of delivering an Ultimatum to Tokyo which it had no means of backing up, and which would, if rejected, jeopardize the safety of Hongkong and Singapore, and indeed, of all of its possessions in the Far East? No responsible British Government would

be guilty of such foolhardiness, even if public opinion in the Empire had been so aroused as to make it possible to ask Parliament to sanction naval and military mobilizations and a war with Japan.

Anglo-Chinese Relations

And this brings me to my second point. In the present state of British finances the last thing that the nation or the Government desires is any foreign adventures. It would be impossible to convince the British public that it was under any obligation to undertake the protection of China against Japanese aggression. China claims that Japan's acts constitute violations of solemn international covenants. For years past, however, the considered policy of the National Government has been one of Treaty repudiation. It has endeavoured to recover by force, by deliberately instigated mob violence, and by lawless boycotting activities, rights which are based upon valid Treaties. From 1925 onward the British Government and its nationals have had frequent cause to complain of unfriendly and provocative acts. Throughout the greater part of 1925 British trade was subjected, on spurious pretexts, to a boycott which in many parts of the country was as lawless and as violent as that which has recently been directed against Japan. But for internal political difficulties it was the intention of the Chinese Government to repudiate the extraterritorial provisions of the British and other Treaties on January 1 this year.

If the events of the past seven years are viewed dispassionately the British Government and its nationals have no reason to feel under any special obligations to China. On the contrary, they must take the view that every act of forbearance, every conciliatory gesture, has been interpreted as a sign of weakness, and, far from being reciprocated, has prompted more intensive attacks upon their Treaty position.

Costly Protection

In 1925, and again in 1927, there was hardly a British subject in China who would not have welcomed an Ultimatum from his own Government couched in terms similar to that recently delivered by Japan, and forceful action, if required, to back it up. It is no secret that at one time, disgusted with the continuous bad faith of the Chinese authorities, Great Britain did seriously contemplate the reoccupation of Hankow. Protection of British interests in China from the hostility of the Nationalists has cost the British taxpayer many millions of pounds.

In such circumstances, to expect the British people to be willing to protect the Chinese from the consequences of a similarly

provocative policy towards another Great Power is ludicrous. Sympathise as we may with the difficulties inherent in a revolutionary phase of China's history, we cannot be expected to embark upon another Great War to save this nation from the consequences of its own folly. The British Government is ready, at it has shown at Geneva and at Paris, and, more recently, in association with other Powers., to exert all its influence in favour of peace. But it is compelled to recognize, from its own experiences with China, that when it comes to a question of Treaty violations, the Chinese Government has a bad case. Great Britain intends to do all in her power to protect her substantial interests in Shanghai, from whatever quarter they may be threatened. But she does not intend to fight Japan to prevent her from adopting what she maintains—rightly or wrongly—is a policy aimed solely at protecting her interests. What I have said regarding Great Britain applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other Governments interested in Shanghai—America, France, and Italy.

The Lesson of the Crisis

I have stated, and believe, that once Japan's patience was exhausted, and she had turned from protests to positive action, any settlement that could be construed as a defeat—diplomatic or military—would react disadvantageously upon the interests of other foreign nations in this country, and especially in Shanghai. For seven years or more China has had abundant opportunity to prove to friendly nations that the readjustment of her Treaty position could be achieved on a basis of mutual goodwill.

She has elected, instead, to flout the Treaty Powers, and so to conduct her foreign and domestic policy as to convince many of her foreign friends that force had become the sole alternative to the abandonment of their interests in this country. Her statesmen and politicians appear to have taken the view that membership of the League of Nations precluded the use of force against her, no matter to what extent she carried her provocation of Foreign Powers. In the event, she has been proved to have been grievously mistaken. And now that force is being employed, however regrettable the forms it may take, one must hope that it will at least achieve this object: that it will convince responsible Chinese that the attainment of their national aspirations must be conditioned on a due regard for the rights of other nations, and that no international organizations, such as the League, and no international Pacts have been designed, or can operate, merely to enable her to escape the consequences of her own provocation, procrastination, and evasion.

No one would be better pleased than the Foreign Community here to see peace restored locally on a basis honourable to both sides.

But that will not be practicable if what has unquestionably been a prolonged and gallant resistance on the part of the local Chinese garrison is magnified into a victory over the Japanese. So far only a few thousand Japanese Bluejackets have been engaged. They are not specially trained for land warfare, and there can be no doubt that their operations have been accompanied by numerous blunders. But the determination of the Japanese Government to reject any settlement that implies defeat is evidenced by the despatch of a Military Division. And however gallant and prolonged the resistance of the Chinese forces locally may be, the only possible result will be to add to Japan's determination to break it down, no matter what reinforcements—naval and military—may be required to achieve this purpose. That, as I see it, is the practical aspect of the situation. It may be deplorable ; it must, if it continues, lead to further fighting and loss of life. But it is idle to ignore the facts. Japan will not accept defeat in her present adventure.

“East is East”

(By Harry Archibald in *The Central China Post, Hankow,*
Feb. 3, 1932)

The utter failure of the four years of effort on the part of the best statesmen that the Western Powers can produce to induce something like alignment in the views of the Chinese and their own people, coupled with the huge sacrifices that have been made, constitute outstanding proof of Rudyard Kipling's assertion that “East is East and West is West, and ne'er the twain shall meet.” It cannot be for lack of willingness on the part of the West, for those who represent that part of the world have gone as far, in fact dangerously so, in their efforts to meet alleged Chinese aspirations. It is a fundamental difference between the mentality of the Oriental and the Occidental that the poet envisages which is the root cause.

No better example of this can be found than the recent utterances in the Nanking official organ of publicity regarding the Commission of Inquiry now on its way to Manchuria. According to a translation sent out by Reuter, “The Commission on its arrival here will have an unpleasant welcome. Mere mention of the League brings a feeling of disgust to Chinese minds.” The fall of Chinchow, it is asserted, destroyed the last remnant of prestige the League enjoyed, and the Chinese have now forgotten that such an institution exists. Such a statement was not unexpected among close observers who have had real experience of China and its people. We ourselves did not hesitate to predict this result, nor point out that the same fate awaits America as soon as the Chinese realize that the United States can do no more than the League of Nations.

One thing that might account for a cold welcome is the uncertainty as to the scope of the operations of the Commission. It has on several occasions been suggested that the scope of inquiry should include China, inasmuch as it is essential, if justice is to be administered, that the causes which have led to the present imbroglio be also brought under review. Undoubtedly if this suggestion is acted upon it will bring Nanking's actions into the limelight and they will be unable wholly to escape criticism. It might even bring to light the details of the alliance between the Soong, Chiang and Chang families which Japan has unequivocally shown she is determined to put an end to where Manchuria is concerned. These suggestions as to inquiry into Chinese or Kuomintang actions appear to have been replaced by the term, “The Commission will have the widest possible scope in its operations.”

If it means that they will have the power to inquire into provocative actions on the side of China as well as Japan then the term

"unpleasant welcome" is a more fitting description than the "cold" usually applied. Apart from this aspect of the case, however, it is obvious that China's idea of the service to which they were entitled was that the League, through its constituent Western members, would forthwith attack Japan, leaving the Kuomintang to dictate the spoils of war. Had any of the leaders been able to envisage the present position in which Japanese diplomacy has proved as wily as their own, with the added ability to back their diplomacy with force of arms, it is unlikely that there would be a Japanese occupation of territory to-day. The *fait accompli* presented has pricked the bubble of Kuomintang pretensions both at home and abroad, and, no matter how much gas in the form of propaganda is used, it will prove insufficient to again inflate it.

As far as Asia is concerned, the League is no doubt in eclipse, but is this such a catastrophe as the propagandists of the League would have the world believe? Nothing but trouble has eventuated since the protagonists of Asiatic uplift succeeded in inducing the Western world to regard China on a plane of equality and worthy of, if they could possibly bring it about, a permanent seat on the Council of the League. To-day it should be apparent to them that the Chinese idea of equality and liberty is the equality of the robbed and oppressed and the liberty of the few in power to take without let or hindrance from any quarter. There is neither equality nor liberty in any other respect in China, and, until the present contretemps arose, the League as a whole were, perhaps unconsciously, strong supporters of this. The fact that to-day they are not arouses a feeling of disgust in the minds of those who counted on the support becoming active. It will now be the turn of America and Great Britain to fight China's battle for her. These in turn will feel the weight of Chinese denunciation when their inability to fight Japan becomes apparent. Behind the scenes frantic efforts are now being made to induce foreign intervention in China proper in the hopes of stemming the Japanese advance, but it is hardly likely that European Powers will be enamoured of the latest bone of contention thrown them, or openly ally themselves with China against Japan.

In reality, their abstention will be for the good of China. Sooner or later the Kuomintang will receive its *coup de grace*, and foreign money, Japanese experience and Chinese industry will come to be recognized as the only possible alliance that will be of any value to China. It is natural that Western Powers should look askance at such a prospect, but if the co-operative principles of the League of Nations mean anything at all, such alliance is inevitable. China, however, has a hard row to hoe before it realizes it.

American Advice from a Great American

(From Hearst's San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 4, 1932)

In the war crisis in China there are possibilities of much trouble for the United States and of no advantage.

Yet there is no need whatever for American participation in the Chino-Japanese conflict.

As long as we can protect our nationals at Shanghai and elsewhere in China **without involving the United States in the warfare between Japan and China**, we owe it to ourselves as a Nation to provide such protection.

When we can no longer protect our nationals on the mainland of Asia without being dragged into the warfare between Japan and China, we should evacuate our nationals to Manila and organize for their protection there until it is safe for them to return to China.

Under no circumstances should the United States permit European powers to use the open door policy, the Kellogg pact, the League of Nations covenant, or any other excuse camouflaging their own interests, **to involve this country in the conflict between Japan and China.**



It is true that the United States enunciated the open door policy more than thirty years ago in an effort to discourage the partition of China, foster peace in the Far East, and keep open the channels of trade for ourselves and other nations.

But President Roosevelt, a man of far greater wisdom and far better Americanism than the present President, spoke powerfully and truthfully for the American people when he declared that they would never go to war to enforce the open door policy in the Far East.

As President, Roosevelt acted upon this assumption in his conduct of our foreign relations ; and after he left the White House, he urged his successor there to do likewise.

Writing to President Taft on Dec. 22, 1910, Roosevelt said :

“ Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country and at the same time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea.

“ It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their interests....I do not believe in our taking any position anywhere unless we can make good ; and as regards Man-

churia, if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we can not stop it unless we are prepared to go to war ; and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England, plus an army as good as that of Germany.

"The open door policy in China was an excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in the future, so far as it can be maintained by general diplomatic agreement ; but, as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and Japan, the open door policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of war rather than forego its intention."

This was wise and statesmanlike advice from a great American to the Government at Washington when Roosevelt gave it.

It is much needed advice to the Government we have at Washington to-day.